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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
v. 
TONYA ALTHOFF, 
Respondent/Appellant 
CaseNo.20050269-SC 
CaseNo.20030373-CA 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to its power to grand certiorari. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does a police officer give expert, as opposed to lay, opinion testimony when 
expressing an opinion as to the amount of a controlled substance that typically constitutes 
personal use? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "When reviewing cases under certiorari 
jurisdiction, we apply a standard of correctness to the decision made by the court of 
appeals rather than the trial court." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ^  7, — P.3d 
"However, the ultimate question of whether a particular set of facts satisfies a given legal 
standard is a mixed question of law and fact." Id. Nonetheless, a trial court is granted 
1 
"wide discretion in his control over the examination of witnesses—lay and expert alike." 
Perkins v. Fit-well artificial limb co., 514 p.2d 811,812 (Utah 1973). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following rules of evidence are central to the issues in this case: 
Utah R.Evid 701: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to 
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness1 testimony or the determination of 
a fact in issue. 
Utah R. Evid 702: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Tonya Althoff ("Althoff') and a companion, Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger, were 
arrested following a traffic stop in Monticello, Utah, on September 23,2002. R. 141:54. On 
September 26, 2002, she was charged by information with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii)(West 204); possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 
2004); driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
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of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6 (West 2004); driving on suspended or revoked driver's 
license, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(l)(West 
2004);and Failure to secure new registration and new certificate of title for her automobile, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41 -1 a-703(West 2004). Following a 
one-day jury trial, Althoff was convicted on all counts. Rothlisberger was convicted of 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of paraphernalia. 
R. 90. On May 19,2003, Althoff received a one-to-15-year prison term, 12 months injail, a 
fine of $925 and 36 months probation. R. 115-17. Rothlisberger received a suspended one-
to-15-year prison term, 12 months injail, a fine of $925 and 36 months probation. R. 115-
17. However, his probation was later revoked and he was sent to prison. R. 157, 198-99. 
Both defendants timely appealed. R. 118. 
In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed Rothlisberger's conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, but upheld his conviction for 
possession of paraphernalia. State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, ^31 n.7, 95 P.3d 
1193, Addendum A. Several months later, the court, relying on Rothlisberger, also reversed 
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defendant's conviction, apparently on all counts. See State v. Althoff, 2005 UT App 69 
(Memorandum Decision), Addendum B.1 
The State timely petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari in both cases. On 
November 24,2004, this Court granted the State's petition as to Rothlisberger. See Case No. 
20040754-SC. On June 1, 2005, this Court granted the State's petition as to Althoff and 
consolidated the matters for oral argument. 
Statement of Facts 
An eventful day 
September 24, 2002, was an eventful day for Althoff and her companion, Thomas 
Kevin Rothlisberger. While returning from Arizona, the two attracted the attention of 
Monticello Police Officer Jim Eberling, who observed their car swerving and erratically 
changing lanes. R. 141:50. When the vehicle stopped on the side of the road, Eberling 
pulled up behind and asked the driver, Althoff, if anything was wrong. She explained that 
she had been driving a long time and was tired. R. 141:51. Officer Eberling allowed her to 
leave, but stopped her again almost immediately after learning that the plates on the car had 
expired. Id. She was arrested when Officer Eberling discovered her driver's license had 
Even if this Court declines to reverse the court of appeals on the central issue of both 
cases—namely, whether a police officer provides "expert" testimony when he or she testifies 
about the amounts of methamphetamine typically possessed for personal use vs. 
distribution—it should still reverse in part because the^/zoj^decision sweeps too broadly in 
apparently reversing defendant's convictions on all charges, including possession of drug 
paraphernalia, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and driving on suspended or 
revoked driver's license, none of which are premised on the allegedly improper "expert" 
testimony of Chief Adair. 
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been suspended. R. 141:52. Officer Eberling and Police Chief Kent Adair, who arrived to 
assist in the arrest, searched the vehicle and discovered two baggies of methamphetamine, 
scales and a device used for storing and ingesting methamphetamine called a "snort tube." 
R. 141:53-56. The snort tube was covered with a white residue later identified as 
methamphetamine. R. 141:62. 
An amicable arrest 
Following their arrest, Rothlisberger and Althoff were highly cooperative, 
volunteering information about their purchase and use of methamphetamine. Rothlisberger 
admitted he had used methamphetamine earlier in the day and that the snort tube discovered 
in the search belonged to him. R. 141:87-88. Althoff acknowledged that the 
methamphetamine had been purchased in Bluff, Utah, that she had used methamphetamine 
earlier in the day and that she generally uses it twice a day. R. 141:69, 89. She also stated 
that the gym bag containing the scales and baggies belonged to her. R. 141:69. 
Despite their candor, they did not volunteer the location of the drugs, which officers 
discovered on their own. The first baggy containing a small amount of methamphetamine 
was quickly discovered in plain view between the driver and passenger seats. R. 141:53-54. 
Eberling also found a gym bag in the back seat of the car that contained drug scales, which 
was covered with a white residue, and several baggies. R. 141:59. Monticello Police Chief 
Kent Adair, who arrived to assist in the arrest, discovered a second baggy of 
methamphetamine after observing that Rothlisberger was very nervous while Officer 
Eberling searched the front passenger seat. R. 141:83, 85. 
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"I went over and told Jim—Officer Eberling—that whatever he was looking for was 
in the front passenger seat," Chief Adair recalled. R. 141:85. 
Chief Adair discovered the second baggy inside a toilet paper roll hidden underneath a 
pair of men's pants that had been stuffed into the door panel on the passenger's side of the 
car. R. 141:84-85. Analysis later determined the baggy contained 32 grams of 
methamphetamine. R. 141:58, 100. 
With the discovery of these additional items, both defendants resumed their candid 
acknowledgment of culpability. Rothlisberger admitted the pants and the snort tube 
discovered in the pocket were his. R. 141:97. He also told Chief Adair, "'I got that [the 
device]—I've had that or I got that in my divorce,' or 'I've had that since my divorce.'" R. 
141:87. Althoff claimed that all of the "crystal meth" was hers and that defendant knew 
nothing about it. R. 141:61. 
Trial 
At trial, Officer Eberling and Chief Adair testified about the arrest and the 
significance of the quantity of drugs found in the car. Defense counsel first elicited 
testimony concerning the significance of the quantities of methamphetamine during cross-
examination of Officer Eberling: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe, if I can go back, Exhibit No. 1 
[small baggy] right here was what you found on the console, right? 
[OFFICER EBERLING]: Yes. 
Q. That was with a small amount? 
A. Uh-huh. 
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Q. Is that characteristic of what's sold? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is. What—I mean you testified you believed it was for sale 
(inaudible). Do you know how many (inaudible)? 
A. I don't— 
Q. Is that just one? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. You have no idea on that. But that was what was found on the 
console, right? 
A. Yes . . . . 
Q. This wasn't the amount that made you think that they had it for 
sale, right? It was this amount [large baggy]? 
A. Right. 
Q. And that was found in the side door? 
A. Right. 
R. 141:64. 
Chief Adair testified that he had been a police officer for 20 years. R. 141:82. During 
that time, he had garnered extensive training and experience in drug intervention, including 
40 hours of annual training for certification purposes. Id. He estimated that he had been 
involved in at least 100 drug cases and he supervised members of the San Juan County Drug 
Task Force. Id. He also said he had learned through his experience how much 
methamphetamine is generally possessed for personal use: 
[PROSECUTOR]: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion in 
your experience to look or see how methamphetamine is usually 
packaged as far as - when you have found methamphetamine in 
your experience (inaudible) have you found times when people 
have had personal use amounts? 
[CHIEF ADAIR]: Yes. 
Q. How is it usually packaged or what is the quantity? 
A. A quarter or half grams [sic], right in there. Maybe even 
at the most a gram.... 
Q. Do you have—through your training and experience, do 
you know commonly what somebody would buy if they were to 
go out on the street buy some right now, what would they 
usually get for personal use? . . . 
A. In our undercover investigations when we buy from 
individuals, we usually buy a quarter or a half a gram. 
Q. Have you ever found in your experience that someone 
who had personal quantities of methamphetamine to have 
scales? 
A. It's not common, no. 
Q. Do you know what those kind of items are used for other 
than—have you seen these kinds of baggies where you have 
found methamphetamine? 
A. Yes. . . . It's quite common with methamphetamine, 
cocaine and those drugs in small quantities. You don't see that 
with marijuana. 
Q. Have you ever - have you seen scales like this before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In what context? 
A. Usually people that have quantities of drugs have scales. 
R. 141:90-92. 
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The two defense attorneys objected to this testimony, claiming it was "expert 
testimony" under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, and, as such, was improper because the 
State had not given the defense 30 days advance notice, as required by statute.2 R. 141:104-
05. The trial court overruled the objection, holding that Chief Adair testified as a "lay 
witness" under rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence, which allows opinion testimony that 
"would be rationally based on his perception, and would be helpful to a clear understanding 
or determination of the facts and issues." R. 141:105. 
Appeal 
In reversing both convictions, the court of appeals held that Chief Adair's testimony 
was improperly admitted as lay opinion testimony under rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Id. at \ 26. According to the court, his testimony was actually expert testimony, which 
should not have been admitted because the State did not meet the requirements of the expert 
witness notification statute, which requires 30 days advance notice. Id.; see Utah Code Ann. 
§77-17-13 (West 2004). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Contrary to the holding of the court of appeals, the trial court correctly admitted Chief 
Adair's testimony concerning the significance of different quantities of drugs, i.e., that those 
who possess methamphetamine for personal use generally possess only a quarter- or half-
gram. Chief Adair's testimony is lay opinion testimony, admissible under Rule 701, Utah 
2
 Defense counsel apparently made this objection during an unrecorded side-bar 
conference, then later articulated the basis for the objection outside the presence of the jury. 
R. 141:90,104-08. 
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Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by this Court. Moreover, this view accords with relevant 
authority from other jurisdictions. The court of appeals erred principally in relying on 
federal rules, commentary and caselaw to interpret Utah's rule 701, which has different 
language from the federal rule 701 and has been interpreted differently by this Court. 
Alternatively, Chief Adair's testimony should be regarded simply as statements of fact 
admissible without appeal to rules governing opinion testimony. Finally, even assuming 
arguendo that Chief Adair's opinion testimony was erroneously admitted, any error was 
harmless because defendant's trial counsel introduced similar testimony on cross-
examination of another witness. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A POLICE OFFICER'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE 
QUANTITY OF METHAMPHETAMINE GENERALLY 
POSSESSED FOR PERSONAL USE IS NOT EXPERT 
TESTIMONY. 
In a 2-1 opinion, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in admitting 
"expert" testimony by Chief Adair without requiring the State to meet the notice 
requirements of Utah law. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226 at f 32. The court reaches this 
conclusion, not in reliance Utah's rule 701, but on what it describes as "the narrow 
interpretative approach. . . . embodied by the 2000 amendment to rule 701 of the Federal 
The State will refer to the Rothlisberger opinion throughout this brief because the 
AlthoffpaneVs one-page memorandum decision simply incorporates Rothlisberger without 
performing independent legal analysis. 
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Rules of Evidence..." Id. at \ 20. The 2000 amendments added a final clause to the federal 
rule: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form 
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are 
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, 
and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge 
within the scope of Rule 702. 
(Emphasis added to highlight amendment.) Relying largely on this amendment to the federal 
rule and the accompanying advisory committee notes, the Rothlisberger majority held that 
Chief Adair provided expert testimony when he stated that those who possess 
methamphetamine for personal use generally possesses "[a] quarter or half grams [sic], right 
in there.. . at the most a gram." See Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226 at ^ 26. The court 
stated, further, that because it was expert testimony, the trial court improperly admitted it 
under rule 701. Id. Under rule 701, Chief Adair was limited to "'the realm of common 
experience' for the common juror," such as "his perceptions of the events" on the day of 
defendant's arrest and "any opinions relating to any matters arising therefrom that would 
have been within the common experience of a common citizen." Id. (citing Randolph v. 
Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844, 846 (10th Cir 1979)). This result is compelled by a need 
to avoid "the open-ended approach . . . [that] would not only blur the distinction between 
rules 701 and 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, but would also create the very real danger 
that parties might impermissibly seek to avoid the reliability and reporting requirements 
required under our law by merely engaging in semantics." Id. 
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To an extent, the court's concern is legitimate. A failure to adhere to reasoned 
distinctions between lay and expert testimony could result in the abuses the court identifies. 
However, this case does not implicate those concerns. Moreover, the Rothlisberger majority 
does not provide the analysis needed to properly distinguish lay from expert testimony and to 
prevent abuses. As a result, the court errs in concluding that allowing Chief Adair to testify 
would blur the distinction between lay and expert testimony. In fact, this Court, along with 
many others, has recognized that testimony such as Chief Adair's may be admitted as lay 
opinion testimony under rule 701. 
A. When Properly Interpreted, Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence Allows Lay Opinion Testimony From A Police Officer 
Concerning the Quantity of Methamphetamine Generally 
Possessed for Personal Use. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence, like similar rules in virtually every state and federal 
jurisdiction, recognize two kinds of opinion testimony—expert and lay. Rule 701, which 
governs lay opinion testimony, states that: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in 
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences 
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful 
to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the deterniination of a 
fact in issue. 
Rule 702, which applies to expert witnesses, states that: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
This Court has recognized that witnesses who testify about matters that may be 
subject to expert treatment are not necessarily "experts." Clearly, a police officer may be 
12 
qualified as an expert before testifying about whether a certain quantity of a drug is 
possessed for sale or for personal use. State v. Bankhead, 514 P.2d 800, 803 (Utah 1973) 
(police officer's expert opinion testimony that amount and packaging of heroin indicated it 
was possessed for sale supported guilty verdict).4 Nonetheless, a witness who testifies based 
on personal observation and experience is not necessarily an expert. In State v. Ellis, 748 
P.2d 188, 190-91 (Utah 1987), this Court reviewed defendant's claim that a security guard 
who testified that footprints discovered outside a burglarized residence appeared to be the 
same as those inside. Id. at 190. The defendant claimed that admission of this testimony 
was improper because the guard did not have the expertise to offer an opinion on the 
footprints. Id. This Court rejected that claim: 
It is difficult to understand how [the guard's] lay testimony in 
the form of an opinion became expert testimony. Simply 
because a question might be capable of scientific determination, 
helpful lay testimony touching on the issue and based on 
personal observation does not become expert opinion. It is true 
that if a question is capable of scientific determination, then 
expert testimony is admissible with respect to i t . . . ; however, 
that does not mean that lay opinion testimony is prohibited if the 
provisions of the evidentiary rule are met. 
4
 Although factually very similar to Rothlisberger, Bankhead is distinguishable 
because the Court did not address the question of whether the officer's expert testimony may 
also have been admissible as lay opinion testimony. The defendant raised a sufficiency 
claim and the Court merely noted that possession of certain quantities of heroin may support 
the inference that the drug was possessed for distribution. Bankhead, 514 P.2d at 803. This 
inference may be buttressed by "[experienced officers [who] may give their opinions in 
cases involving possession of heroin that the narcotics are held for purposes of sale based 
upon such matters as the quantity, packaging, and normal use of an individual..." Id. 
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Id. at 191 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).5 
Ellis provides the analytical framework for resolving the issues in this case. Both the 
security guard and Chief Adair spoke from personal knowledge or "perception." See Utah R. 
Evid. 701(a) (opinions or inferences must be "rationally based on the perception of the 
witness"). The guard testified based on his first-hand observation—his "perception"—of 
footprints in the mud outside a broken window and others inside the home leading away 
from the window. Id. at 190. Chief Adair testified based on his first-hand knowledge of 
defendant's arrest and the discovery of the large baggy of methamphetamine inside the 
passenger door panel beneath a pair of defendant's pants. R. 141:84-85. 
The security guard and Chief Adair both offered opinions that were rationally based 
on their experiences. Chief Adair's testimony that the amount of methamphetamine 
typically possessed for personal use is a quarter- to a half-gram was rationally based on his 
experience as a narcotics officer who had participated in undercover operations involving 
controlled buys from dealers. R. 141:91. The guard testified that a muddy footprint found 
outside the house "with the distinctive heel marking appeared to be the one on the inside of 
5
 Utah is not alone in the view that certain evidence is subject to both lay and expert 
treatment. See, e.g., United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1008 (11th Circuit 2001) 
(noting that it is erroneous to assume "that because an expert could provide the type of 
testimony at issue, a lay witness cannot"); Gibson v. W. C.A.B., 861 A.2d 938,944 (Pa. 2004) 
("This Court, from very early in Commonwealth history, interpreted the rules of evidence to 
permit individuals not qualified as experts, but possessing experience or specialized 
knowledge, to testify about technical matters that might have been thought to be within the 
exclusive province of experts"). 
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the carpet." Ellis, 748 P.2d at 190. And while the rational basis for this opinion is not 
explicitly stated, the Court notes that the guard is a former police officer, id, experience that 
likely included evaluating crime scenes. 
Thus, Ellis provides essential guidance in determining the proper scope of expert and 
lay testimony under Utah law. Under Ellis9 lay opinion testimony, such as that provided by 
Chief Adair, is admissible if the witness has first-hand knowledge of facts of the case and his 
opinions and inferences are rationally based upon those facts.6 
In attempting to distinguish Ellis, the Rothlisberger maj ority states that Ellis does not 
resolve "the question of whether there are certain other subjects that should be considered so 
intrinsically specialized that a witness could not testify regarding them without relying on the 
types of 'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge' that are characteristic of 
expert testimony under rule 702." Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226 at ^ j 13. Thus, instead of 
plumbing the Ellis analysis for guidance in resolving the analogous issues in this case, the 
Rothlisberger majority seems intent on limiting Ellis to its "express terms," i.e,. to opinion 
testimony about muddy footprints. Id. at n.3. But Ellis need not be read so narrowly. Ellis 
clearly supports the broader proposition that lay opinion testimony may be based on the 
witness' personal experience without thereby becoming expert opinion testimony. The court 
of appeals' unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of Ellis is largely responsible for the 
erroneous interpretation of Utah's rule 701. 
6
 These points are further developed in section I.B., below. 
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Instead of properly analyzing Ellis, the court of appeals looks to rule 701 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and accompanying commentary along with federal caselaw. The 
federal rule was amended in 2000 to add a final subsection emphasizing that opinion 
testimony admissible under 701 should "not [be] based on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." Fed. R. Evid. 701(c). This federal 
authority, however, is of limited assistance in analyzing rule 701 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, which has been construed by this Court to allow a wider range of lay opinion 
testimony than what may be authorized by the amended federal rule. Also, the court of 
appeals' reliance on interpretation of rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is dubious 
given that Utah has not adopted the amendment. Because Utah's rule 701 has different 
language, the amendment and commentary to the federal rule are especially inapposite.7 
The Rothlisberger majority also errs in relying too heavily on federal appellate 
rulings, some of which do not even address the admissibility of testimony under rule 701. 
See, e.g., United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332 (10th Cir. 1994) and United States v. 
The substantive effect of the 2000 amendments remains unclear. Although the 
advisory committee notes to the 2000 amendment admonish that the amendment is intended 
to "eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded 
through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing," the amendment 
does little if anything to clarify the proper scope of the rule. In fact, the advisory committee 
notes state that the amendment "does not require witnesses to qualify as experts unless their 
testimony is of the type traditionally considered within the purview of Rule 702." Advisory 
Committee Notes to 2000 Amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 701 (emphasis added). Thus, the 
amendment appears to be largely symbolic, intended as a reminder that the two rules 
generally address different types of opinion testimony and that the traditional distinction 
between the two should be maintained. See United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1009, 
n.9 (11th Circuit 2001) (opining that it is an "open question" whether 2000 amendments to 
Fed. R. Evid 701 would entail results different from the unamended version). 
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McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1522 (1(T Cir.), cert denied, 502 U.S. 897 (1991). In 
McDonald, for example, the 10th Circuit ruled that a police narcotics investigator could 
testify as an expert that the 6.7 grams possessed by the defendant "was a lot larger than what 
would normally be considered as a dose." 933 F.2d at 1521. But this holding is, at best, 
tangential to the issues in Rothlisberger because the question of whether the testimony was 
admissible under rule 701 was never raised or addressed. Rather, defense counsel objected 
to the testimony, not because it was improperly admitted expert testimony, but because he 
viewed it as so-called "profile" evidence that invaded the province of the jury. Id. In 
Muldrow the court simply followed McDonald in upholding the admissibility of "expert" 
testimony from a "veteran police officer" that a kilo of cocaine is more than what is needed 
for personal use and indicates intent to distribute. Muldrow, 19 F.3d at 1338. Thus, neither 
case has any clear relevance because they do not consider the question addressed by this 
Court in Ellis and raised in Rothlisberger, i.e., whether the expert testimony, admissible 
under rule 702, was also admissible lay opinion testimony under rule 701. 
The one case cited by the Rothlisberger majority that directly addresses the interplay 
between rules 701 and 702 in the context of a narcotics prosecution is United States v. 
Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 523 U.S. 1131. However, 
because Figueroa-Lopez offers little in the way of the reasoned analysis necessary to 
properly distinguish between lay and expert opinion testimony, its significance is limited. 
Figueroa-Lopez challenged the admission of lay opinion testimony from several DEA agents 
that his actions "were consistent with those of an experienced narcotics trafficker." See, e.g., 
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id. at 1245. Agents testified that experienced narcotics traffickers generally exhibit the 
following behaviors: 
(1) countersurveillance driving; 
(2) use of code words to refer to drug quantities and prices; 
(3) use of a third-person lookout when attending a narcotics meeting; 
(4) use of a rental car to make the drug delivery; 
(5) hiding the cocaine in the door panels of a car; and 
(6) dealing in large amounts of very pure cocaine. 
Id at 1246. 
In evaluating whether this testimony was improperly admitted expert testimony, the 
Figuera-Lopez court turned to authority in the circuit, in particular United States v. 
VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 1995), a case in which a police officer was allowed to 
provide lay testimony concerning the nexus between firearms and drug dealers. In affirming 
the trial court's decision to admit this testimony, the VonWillie court held that "[t]hese 
observations are common enough and require such a limited amount of expertise, if any, that 
they can, indeed, be deemed lay witness opinion." Id. Applying this yardstick, at least 
ostensibly, the Figuera-Lopez court determined that the testimony that defendant was an 
experienced drug trafficker was not "common enough" to be admitted as lay testimony under 
rule 701. Figuera-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1245.8 In an attempt to make the distinction clearer, 
the court then observed that one agent offered proper lay opinion testimony when he 
characterized as "suspicious" the defendant's driving patterns prior to making a drug sale. 
Id. at 1246. 
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the conviction after determining the error was 
harmless. Figuera-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1247. 
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The Rothlisberger majority finds Figuera-Lopez "instructive." Rothlisberger, 2004 
UT App 226 at Tf 21. In truth, however, Figuera-Lopez is so confused that it defies 
consistent interpretation. Figuera-Lopez states only that testimony concerning the nexus 
between guns and drugs and the characterization of a defendant's behavior as "suspicious" 
are "common enough" to be admitted as lay opinion testimony under rule 701, while 
testimony concerning other trappings of the drug trade is not. In reaching this conclusion, 
the court provides no guidance in determining what kind of testimony is "common enough" 
to be admitted under rule 701 or whether the commonality needed is that which is common 
to a DEA agents or to the average citizen.9 Nor does it provide a clear explanation of what 
behavior may properly be deemed by a lay witness as "suspicious" (other than driving in 
circles, as Figueroa-Lopez did) or how lay testimony concerning a nexus between certain 
kinds of weapons and drugs differs from "expert" testimony of other telltale signs of a drug 
distribution operation.10 Because the Rothlisberger majority relies on imprecise and often 
irrelevant federal caselaw, its conclusions are largely unsupported. 
In short, the Rothlisberger majority errs in two principal ways. First, it ignores 
relevant and helpful Utah precedent. Second, the court compounds this error by turning 
9
 As argued in section LB, below, proper lay opinion testimony would include that 
rationally based on the witness' position as a DEA agent. 
10
 The court's failure to articulate the basis for its distinctions limits the opinion to its 
facts. But even so limited, the opinion is internally inconsistent. For example, the court 
states that it was proper lay opinion testimony for a police officer to opine that defendant's 
behavior in driving around a parking lot several times before stopping to make a drug deal is 
properly characterized by a layman as "suspicious," while the significance of 
"countersurveillance driving" requires an expert. Figuera-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1246. 
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instead to the 2000 amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence and federal precedent, 
which is either inapplicable or lacking in coherent analysis. What is necessary is analysis 
offering a principled distinction between the kinds of testimony that fall under rule 701 
versus 702. Below, the State will offer such analysis. 
B. Under Ellis, as well as Cases from Other Jurisdictions that Endorse 
Lay Opinion Testimony Based on a Witness5 Position and Personal 
Experience, Chief Adair's Testimony was Properly Admitted. 
As shown in section A.3 above, the Rothlisberger majority errs because it fails to take 
account of Utah precedent and turns instead to federal authority that is either distinguishable 
or so confused as to offer little clear guidance. Under this Court's precedent, the fact that 
certain testimony is susceptible to expert treatment does not necessarily mean that it must be 
given expert treatment. Ellis, 748 P.2d at 189. Ellis suggests an approach very different from 
the rigid and formalistic ruling from the Rothlisberger court. 
Consistent with Ellis, many jurisdictions have taken a broader view of testimony 
admissible under rule 701, especially in the law enforcement context. For example, police 
officers are allowed to testify on the basis of field sobriety tests or other observations that a 
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defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, even though such testimony is 
11
 E.g., Harris v. Dist. of Columbia, 601 A.2d 21, 25 (D.C. App. 1991); State v. 
Lesac,, 437 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Neb. 1989); State v. Lindley, 210 S.E.2d 207, 210 (N.C. 
1974). 
12
 Miller v. Commonwealth, 835 A.2d 866, 869 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); State v. 
Davies, 811 A.2d 600 (Pa. Sup. 2002); Harris v. Dist. of Columbia, 601 A.2d 21,25 (D.C. 
App. 1991); State v. Locklear, 525 S.E.2d 813, 818 (N.C. App. 2000). Utah courts also 
allow officers to testify about sobriety tests, apparently without requiring expert 
qualifications. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168,1169 (Utah 1983) (based 
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amenable to expert analysis. The Utah Court of Appeals has also held that a police officer 
may offer non-expert testimony identifying the "distinctive aroma" of marijuana and the 
mannerisms involved in smoking it. Provo City v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437,442-43 (Utah App. 
1993); accord Chess v. State, 357 S.W.2d 386, 387-88 (Tex. Cr. App. 1962). 
Courts have been especially receptive to the use of lay opinion testimony from 
narcotics officers and agents, whose personal experiences provide insights into various 
aspects of the drug trade. For example, most if not all courts allow lay testimony from 
narcotics officers and other lay witnesses interpreting the "code words" used by drug 
traffickers. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 980; United States v. 
Coleman, 16 Fed. Appx. 744, 748 (9th Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1147; State v. 
Decay, 798 So.2d 1057,1074 (La. App. 2001), writ denied, 823 So. 2d 939; see also United 
States v. Saulter, 60 F.3d 270,276 (7 Cir. 1995) (witness involved in drug trafficking with 
defendants has same knowledge of code words as investigating agents and may therefore 
offer interpretive testimony); United States v. Scott, 243 F.3d 1103, 1107 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(same), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 931. Narcotics investigators have also been allowed to 
on "observations of the driving pattern, field sobriety tests, the odor, and defendant's speech, 
the officer formed the opinion that the defendant was intoxicated to the point that it impaired 
his driving"); Salt Lake City v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 997,1000 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 
919 P.2d 1208 (sobriety test results admitted, not because they were scientific, but because 
they were based on officer's "training and experience"). The State found only one case in 
which a Utah court considered a challenge to the admission of sobriety test results based on a 
claim that it was improperly admitted expert testimony. See State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 
831, 833-34 (Utah App. 1995). However, the court declined to reach the issue because error, 
if any, was harmless. Id. n.3. 
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provide extensive testimony as laymen concerning the complex finances and operation of 
drug distribution networks, United States v. Aw an, 966F.2d 1415,1430 (11th Cir. 1992), as 
well as other common practices in the drug trade. See, e.g., United States v. Flaherty, 295 
F.3d 182,198 (2nd Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 936 (co-conspirator properly allowed to 
estimate weekly income of defendant in drug distribution operation); State v. Bunch, 408 
S.E.2d 191, 194 (N.C. App. 1991) (agent properly testified that common practice in drug 
transactions was to have different people carrying drugs and money so that, in event of 
arrest, one person would not possess both); State v. Matthews, 720 So.2d 153,163 (La. App. 
1998), writ denied, 740 So.2d 112 (opinion testimony from DEA agent concerning street 
value of drugs proper because it was "within his personal knowledge and experience as a 
narcotics officer"); see also United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131,1145-46 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(co-conspirators in drug manufacturing may offer lay testimony identifying drugs)). 
Many courts have also admitted non-expert testimony concerning drug quantities 
generally possessed for personal use in contrast to amounts possessed for distribution— 
testimony identical to that of Chief Adair. For example, in State v. Frasure, 100 P.3d 1013 
(Mont. 2004), the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute after police 
discovered six baggies of methamphetamine in her purse. Id. at^ f 7. The police officers who 
arrested the defendant testified at trial that the amount of methamphetamine she was carrying 
"illustrated she had an intent to sell." Id. at^ [ 8. The defendant challenged her conviction based 
in part on a claim that the officers improperly testified as experts. Id. at ^ 16. The court quickly 
dispensed with this argument: 
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In this case, the prosecution established that Officers Baumann and Brinkman 
had extensive training and experience in the methods used in the illicit drug 
trade and the prices that illicit drugs, such as methamphetamine, generally 
garner. This provided a sufficient foundation for them to provide lay opinion 
testimony as to whether it was likely that [defendant] possessed the drugs with 
intent to sell. Their testimony was rationally based on their perceptions and 
helped give a clear understanding of whether [defendant] had the necessary 
intent. 
Id. at f 16; accord Commonwealth v. Labitue, 731 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. App. 2000), review 
denied, 137 N.E.2d 467 (permissible for arresting officers to testify that the weight and 
packaging of cocaine defendant possessed was "more consistent with an intent to distribute 
than with an intention to purchase a sizeable quantity for personal use"); Reece v. State, 878 
S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. App. 1994) (police officer who had "made numerous narcotics 
arrests" properly offered lay testimony that large amount of crack cocaine seized from 
defendant, along with $200 in small bills, indicated defendant was selling drugs); State v. 
Hall, 549 So.2d 373,389 (La. App. 1989), writ denied, 556 So.2d 1259 (undercover trooper 
properly offered lay opinion testimony that he believed the defendant regarded him as a 
potential drug buyer); see also United States v. Jones, 17 Fed. Appx. 240,2001 WL 1019398 
(4th Cir. 2001), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1117 (2002) (for sentencing purposes, trial court 
properly relied on lay testimony from fellow inmate concerning the amounts of drugs 
defendant sold at jail); United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788 (8 Cir. 2003) (lay witnesses, 
all of whom had "substantial experience in the use and trade of illegal drugs," were properly 
allowed to estimate the amounts of drugs purchased from defendant over the years). 
In each of these cases, admissibility is a function of whether the witness' testimony is 
"rationally based on [his or her] perception..." See Utah R. Evid. 701 (a). The "perception" 
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component of the rule is satisfied when the witness was in a position to gather the facts that 
form the basis of his or her opinion. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d 
Cir. 1993). In Lightening Lube, the court endorsed the admission of lay testimony 
concerning damages from the owner of the plaintiffs business because he was involved in 
the day-to-day operation of the business and, thus, was in a position to know. Id. at 1175. In 
discussing the kinds of testimony traditionally admissible under rule 701, the advisory 
committee notes to the 2000 amendments to the federal rule endorse the Lightening Lube 
analysis: "Such opinion testimony is admitted not because of experience, training or 
specialized knowledge within the realm of an expert, but because of the particularized 
knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his or her position in the business. The 
amendment does not purport to change this analysis." (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, part of the foundation for a lay witness' testimony is that he or she participated 
in the underlying events in a way that supports rational inferences. "The rational-basis 
requirement 'is the familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation.'" United 
States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127,140 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting advisory committee notes on the 
1972 proposed rule 701 of the federal rules) (additional citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 511 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he witness 
must have 'personal knowledge of the facts from which the . . . opinion is said to derive'") 
(citation omitted). This requirement is differs from the foundational requirements for the 
testimony of an expert, who generally becomes involved in the case long after the underlying 
events and has no connection with case other than the relevance his or her expertise may 
have to a fact in issue. See Utah R. Evid 702. Conversely, under rule 701, the lay witness is 
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almost always a participant with first-hand knowledge. "When a witness has not identified 
the objective bases for his opinion, the proffered opinion obviously fails completely to meet 
the requirements of Rule 7 0 1 . . . because there is no way for the court to assess whether it is 
rationally based on the witness's perceptions . . ." Garcia, 291 F.3d at 140. 
The first-hand knowledge requirement is critical to the admissibility of lay opinion 
testimony. Indeed, many of the courts refusing to admit lay opinion testimony from law 
enforcement personnel have done so not because they viewed it as disguised expert 
testimony, but because the proponent failed to demonstrate that the witness' experiences 
supported his or her opinions or inferences. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 
1305,1309-10 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1056 (police officer's testimony that 
drug users often carry guns improper under rule 701 because it was not "rationally based on 
his perceptions. He did not establish a factual basis for credible opinion testimony regarding 
the likelihood of drug users being armed"); Davis v. State, 434 S.E.2d 132, 134 (Ga. App. 
1993) (reversing conviction for possession with intent to distribute because police officer 
who testified that defendant possessed more heroin than needed for personal use was not 
qualified as an expert "and the State did not otherwise attempt to lay a foundation which 
would demonstrate that the witness was qualified to testify . . . " ) . 
The second foundational component under rule 701 is that the testimony must be 
rationally based on the witness' knowledge of the underlying facts. As one court observed: 
"[A] rational connection must exist between the opinion and the facts upon which it is based; 
or put another way, the opinion... must be one that a normal person would form from those 
perceptions." Soden, 714 F.2d at 511 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). Because 
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testimony covered by this portion of the rule allows a witness to testify based on what could 
be characterized as "specialized knowledge/' it resembles expert testimony, which may 
account for the confusion over the proper reach of rule 701. The difference between the 
specialized knowledge requirement of rule 702 and the personal experience requirement 
under rule 701 has to do with the degree of specialization. "[Traditionally the subject of the 
inference [in expert testimony] must be so distinctively related to a science, profession, 
business, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of lay persons." Strong, John W., 
McCormick on Evidence, § 13 (5th ed. 1999 & 2003 Supp.). Or, as the Tennessee Supreme 
Court stated, "The distinction between an expert and a non-expert witness is that a non-
expert witness' testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life and an 
expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by 
specialists in the field." State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (Tenn.1992). 
Under the foregoing analysis, Chief Adair's comments on the amounts of 
methamphetamine typically possessed for personal use was not expert testimony, but rather 
properly admitted lay opinion testimony. First, Chief Adair had the requisite first-hand 
knowledge of the facts of the case. He assisted in the arrest and discovered the second baggy 
of methamphetamine inside a toilet paper roll hidden beneath a pair of men's pants that had 
been stuffed into the passenger-side door panel of the car. R. 141:84-85. Chief Adair also 
interviewed defendant, who admitted the pants and the snort tube discovered in the pocket 
were his. R. 141:97. In short, Chief Adair's involvement in the case unquestionably meets 
the requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation. See Garcia, 291 F.3d at 140. 
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Second, Chief Adair's testimony had a rational basis because he demonstrated the 
requisite experience with drug investigations to interpret the facts. He testified that he had 
been a police officer for 20 years and that he spent 40 hours annually training in drug 
intervention. R. 141:82. He supervised members of the San Juan County Drug Task Force 
and estimated he has been involved in at least 100 drug cases. Id. He also said his 
experience included undercover investigations in which officers or others posing as buyers 
would purchase a quarter- or half-gram of methamphetamine. Id. at 91. Thus, the following 
testimony is clearly grounded in Chief Adair's personal experience as one of the arresting 
officers whose knowledge of law enforcement allowed him to recognize that defendant and 
his companion were drug dealers: 
[PROSECUTOR]: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion in 
your experience to look or see how methamphetamine is usually 
packaged as far as - when you have found methamphetamine in 
your experience (inaudible) have you found times when people 
have had personal use amounts? 
[CHIEF ADAIR]: Yes. 
Q. How is it usually packaged or what is the quantity? 
A. A quarter or half grams [sic], right in there. Maybe even 
at the most a gram.... 
Q. Do you have—through your training and experience, do 
you know commonly what somebody would buy if they were to 
go out on the street buy some right now, what would they 
usually get for personal use? . . . 
A. In our undercover investigations when we buy from 
individuals, we usually buy a quarter or a half a gram. 
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Q. Have you ever found in your experience that someone 
who had personal quantities of methamphetamine to have 
scales? 
A. It's not common, no. 
Q. Do you know what those kind of items are used for other 
than—have you seen these kinds of baggies where you have 
found methamphetamine? 
A. Yes. . . . It's quite common with methamphetamine, 
cocaine and those drugs in small quantities. You don't see that 
with marijuana. 
Q. Have you ever - have you seen scales like this before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In what context? 
A. Usually people that have quantities of drugs have scales. 
R. 141:90-92. 
These opinions are "rationally based on the perception of the witness and. . . helpful 
to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." 
Utah R. Evid. 701.13 Chief Adair's rationally grounded opinion was that the defendant was 
not merely a drug user, but rather a drug pusher.14 Although the average citizen may not 
13
 The requirement under 701(b) that the testimony be helpful is in essence a 
relevancy requirement and was not challenged below and did not play a role in the court of 
appeals' Rothlisbergex decision. 
14
 This perception has important implications, not only for the defendant, but also for 
Chief Adair or any law enforcement officer who arrests someone involved in the sale of 
narcotics, given that those involved in the drug trade often possess weapons and should be 
regarded with greater caution. See United States v. VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 
1995) (noting nexus between firearms and drug dealers). 
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know how much methamphetamine is possessed for personal use, the process of reasoning 
employed by Chief Adair is "familiar in everyday life." Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 549. Anyone 
who was involved in narcotics purchases, either as an undercover police officer or a user, 
would quickly learn how much is typically sold. Based on this experience, Chief Adair 
knew that 32 grams of methamphetamine is many times the amount needed for personal use. 
Such conclusions do not "result[] from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by 
specialists in the field." See id. Accordingly, the Utah Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Chief Adair's testimony. 
C. Alternatively, Chief Adair's Testimony was Properly Admitted 
Because It Consisted of Statements of Fact 
Alternatively, Chief Adair's testimony was admissible because his statements were 
not opinions at all, but statements of fact. Indeed, this is the conclusion reached by the trial 
court when asked to reconsider the same issues in a post-trial motion for a certificate of 
probable cause. R. 211-13. "The testimony] actually turned out to be neither expert 
testimony or lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony about Adair's actual experiences." 
R. 212. A number of courts have taken this view of testimony involving descriptions of the 
drug trade drawn from a law enforcement officer's experience. For example, in Davenport 
v. UnitedStates, 197F.2dl57,158(5*0^. 1952), certdenied, 344 U.S. 835, the court ruled 
that an officer's testimony concerning an item of drug paraphernalia called a "finger stall" 
"was neither immaterial nor a conclusion. The witness was not asked to give his opinion as 
to the use made or intended to be made of the particular finger stall found. In connection 
with his testimony as to finding it, he was asked, and testified, as to the nature and uses of 
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finger stalls as he had observed them in his work as a narcotic officer. The answers made 
were relevant and factual, and it was not error to admit them in evidence." Accord United 
States v. DiMarzo, 80 F.3d 656 (1st Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 904 (1997) (law 
enforcement agent's testimony concerning practices within drug trade not opinion 
testimony); United States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7,12(lstCir. 1996), cert denied, 519U.S. 1055 
("This testimony was not opinion testimony at all, but a simple recitation of an observed 
phenomenon: the price paid for the coins"). 
In DiMarzo, the investigating agent, like Chief Adair, was one of the arresting officers 
and testified about the "sting" operation resulting in the arrest of defendant and others. 
DiMarzo, 80 F.3d at 658-59. The agent also testified concerning practices in the drug trade, 
such as whether drug crime participants generally carry guns and whether innocent observers 
are invited to drug transactions. Id. at 659. The defendant claimed on appeal that this was 
improperly admitted expert testimony because the prosecutors had not provided proper 
notice under the federal rules. Id. The court rejected this contention, holding that the agent's 
testimony 
expressed neither a lay nor an expert opinion, as distinguished 
from a statement of fact as to what [the agent] had witnessed 
during his 29 years in law enforcement. As the challenged 
testimony proffered no opinion, lay or expert, but simply the 
witness's personal experience relating to a subject bearing 
directly upon the appropriateness of a jury inference,... we 
reject the claim. 
Id. at 659-60 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original). 
Chief Adair similarly drew on his 20 years of law enforcement experience in noting 
that those who possess methamphetamine for personal use usually have less than a gram and 
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generally do not have scales. Chief Adair never took the additional step of opining that 
because of his experience, he believes defendant possessed the drugs with intent to 
distribute. In short, Chief Adair offered no opinion on the significance of the quantities of 
methamphetamine possessed by defendant. Thus, whether viewed as opinion or simply 
statements of fact, Chief Adair's testimony was admissible. 
II. EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING CHIEF 
ADAIR'S TESTIMONY, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in admitting Chief Adair's 
opinion testimony, any error was harmless because Officer Eberling had already provided 
similar testimony in response to defense counsel's questions. 
"The complaining party cannot be prejudiced by the allegedly inadmissible 
evidence if that party offers evidence to the same effect as the challenged evidence . . . or 
if the challenged evidence is merely cumulative to other admitted evidence of like tenor." 
Dunn v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Co., 621 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Mo. App. 1981); 
accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. McGee, 276 S.E.2d 108, 111 (Ga. App.1981) ("Since prior to 
the complained of testimony other testimony of the same nature was admitted without 
objection, any error in the admission of the subsequent testimony is deemed harmless"); 
Milford State Bank v. West Field Canal and Irr., 162P.2d 101, 103 (Utah 1945) 
(improper testimony not prejudicial where similar testimony had been previously 
admitted); see also State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1232 (Utah 1998) (defendant cannot 
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complain of testimony solicited by State on cross-examination when defendant "opened 
the door" by soliciting same testimony on direct). 
The following exchange occurred during defendant's cross-examination of Officer 
Eberling: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe, if I can go back, Exhibit No. 1 right 
here was what you found on the console, right? 
[OFFICER EBERLING]: Yes. 
R. That was with a small amount? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that characteristic of what's sold? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is. What—I mean you testified you believed it was for sale 
(inaudible). Do you know how many (inaudible)? 
A. I don't— 
Q. Is that just one? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. You have no idea on that. But that was what was found on the 
console, right? 
A. Yes . . . . 
Q. This wasn't the amount that made you think that they had it for 
sale, right? It was this amount? 
A. Right. 
Q. And that was found in the side door? 
A. Right. 
32 
R. 141:64-65. 
Defendant clearly was the first to solicit testimony suggesting that he and Alfhoff 
were not just users, but rather dealers. Although Officer Eberling's testimony was not as 
detailed or direct as Chief Adair's, defense counsel still was the first to solicit testimony 
concerning the amount of methamphetamine that is "characteristic of what's sold." 
Accordingly, he cannot complain when the State offered testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to issue a writ of 
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals directing entry of a judgment affirming the trial 
court's rulings and Althoff s guilt. 
Respectfully submitted rf^Say of July 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
BRETT J. EfeLPORTO 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Thomas Kevin ROTHLISBERGER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20030494-CA. 
July 1,2004. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in 
the Seventh District Court, Monticello 
Department, Lvle R. Anderson, J., of 
possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute and one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jackson, 
J., held that: 
(1) officer's testimony regarding 
significance of amount of methamphetamine 
found was expert testimony; 
(2) defendant did not waive his right to 
challenge admission of expert testimony by 
failing to request continuance; and 
(3) State failed to provide proper notice to 
defendant of testimony of office who was 
expert witness. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bench, P.J., dissented. 
West Headnotes 
JjJ Criminal Law €^>629(11) 
110k629Q 1) Most Cited Cases 
Police officer's testimony that amount of 
methamphetamine found was significant in 
that it was likely that large amount was 
intended for further sale was expert 
testimony in possession with intent to 
distribute prosecution, requiring State to 
give defendant 30 days notice of testimony; 
testimony was necessarily based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge. Rules of Evid., Rule 702: 
U.C.A.1953,77-17-13nXa). 
121 Criminal Law €=^478(1) 
110k478Q) Most Cited Cases 
When a witness seeks to testify regarding 
matters that are necessarily based on that 
witness's "scientific, technical, or 
specialized knowledge," that witness must 
be qualified as an expert under rule 
governing testimony of experts, and all 
reliability, reporting, or otherwise applicable 
statutory commands must then be followed 
with respect to that testimony. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 702. 
131 Criminal Law €=^478(1) 
110k478(n Most Cited Cases 
Witnesses can be qualified as experts not 
only on the basis of formal educational 
training, but also on the basis of their own 
personal or vocational experiences. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 702. 
1£ Criminal Law €^>474.5 
110k474.5 Most Cited Cases 
i £ Criminal Law €^>478(1) 
110k478m Most Cited Cases 
Knowledge regarding the significance of a 
particular quantity of drug is beyond the 
realm of common experience for the 
common juror, and is accordingly the type 
of testimony that a witness could offer only 
if first qualified as an expert. Rules of 
Evid., Rule 702. 
151 Criminal Law €^>1030(1) 
110kl030(n Most Cited Cases 
Parties are not required to make futile 
objections in order to preserve a future 
claim. 
161 Criminal Law €^1036.6 
110kl036.6 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant did not waive his right to 
challenge admission of expert testimony by 
failing to request continuance, where trial 
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court first erred by concluding that 
challenged testimony was admissible as lay 
witness testimony, making any objection 
based on expert testimony rules futile. 
Rules ofEvid., Rule 702. 
HI Criminal Law €^629(11) 
110k629a 1) Most Cited Cases 
A party who is seeking to offer expert 
testimony must first provide the other party 
with a copy of the expert's name, address, 
and curriculum vitae; this clearly 
contemplates that the opposing party will 
have the opportunity to prepare for that 
expert's testimony in a witness-specific 
fashion. U.C.A.1953,77-17-13(lYb\ 
181 Criminal Law €=>629(11) 
110k629(l 1) Most Cited Cases 
State failed to provide proper notice to 
defendant of testimony of police officer who 
was expert witness; although another officer 
offered testimony that was similar in 
content, officer did not testify as expert at 
preliminary hearing, and State did not 
provide defense with copy of officer's name, 
address, and curriculum vitae. U.C.A.1953, 
77-17-13(5)(aV 
*1194 Barton J. Warren, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Brett J. 
Delporto, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee. 
Before BENCH. Associate P J., JACKSON 
and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
**!***! Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger was 
convicted of one count of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute and one count of Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia. Rothlisberger now 
argues that the trial court erred in admitting 
the testimony of Monticello Police Chief 
Kent Adair (Chief Adair) as lay witness 
testimony, and that the State therefore erred 
by failing to provide thirty days notice of 
that testimony as required by Utah Code 
Annotated section 77-17-13 (2003). We 
affirm in part and reverse in part. 
BACKGROUND 
***2 On September 24, 2002, Tonya 
Althoff and Rothlisberger were pulled over 
while returning to Utah after a brief trip to 
Arizona. Officer Jim Eberling (Officer 
Eberling) initially pulled the pair over after 
observing an improper lane change. At the 
time of the stop, Althoff was driving the car 
and Rothlisberger was sitting in the front 
passenger seat. A subsequent search of 
police records by Officer Eberling revealed 
that the license plates on the car had expired 
and that Althoff s driver license had been 
suspended. Because of this, Althoff was 
removed from the vehicle and placed under 
arrest. 
***3 After Althoff had been handcuffed 
and placed in Officer Eberling's car, Officer 
Eberling conducted a search of the vehicle. 
During this search, Officer Eberling 
discovered a small plastic bag containing 
methamphetamine thai was located in plain 
view on the console between the two front 
seats. Sometime during this initial phase of 
the *1195 search, Chief Adair arrived on the 
scene. Due to the discovery of the small 
plastic bag containing methamphetamine on 
the front console, the officers placed 
Rothlisberger under arrest and continued 
with their search of the car. During this 
search, Chief Adair noticed that 
Rothlisberger had acted very nervous while 
Officer Eberling was searching in the area of 
the front passenger seat. Based on 
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Rothlisbergerfs behavior, Chief Adair 
instructed Officer Eberling to focus on the 
passenger side of the car. Further search led 
to the discovery of a pair of men's pants that 
had been stuffed into the passenger's side 
door panel. Inside of the pants was a small 
plastic bag, placed inside of a toilet paper 
roll, that contained what was later shown to 
be thirty-two grams of methamphetamine. 
The officers also found a snort tube with the 
pair of pants. The snort tube was covered 
with a white residue that was later identified 
as methamphetamine. During the further 
search of the vehicle, the officers also found 
a gym bag in the trunk that contained drug 
scales, covered in white residue, and several 
small plastic bags. 
***4 After being given the Miranda 
warnings, Rothlisberger admitted to officers 
that the pants found stuffed in the passenger 
side door were his. Rothlisberger also 
admitted that the snort tube was his. 
Rothlisberger further admitted to having 
used methamphetamine before leaving 
Arizona earlier that morning. After being 
given the Miranda warnings, Althoff 
claimed that the gym bag found in the trunk 
was hers. She also claimed that the 
methamphetamine found in the car was hers, 
and that Rothlisberger had no knowledge of 
it. 
**2 ***5 on September 26, 2002, 
Rothlisberger was charged with one count of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with 
Intent to Distribute, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iip 
(2003), and one count of Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated section 58-37a-5(l) (2003). 
[FN11 On December 2, 2002, Rothlisberger 
appeared before the district court for his 
preliminary hearing. At the preliminary 
hearing, Officer Eberling testified regarding 
the significance of the quantity of drugs 
found in Rothlisberger's pair of pants. 
Officer Eberling specifically testified that 
the drugs found in the pants were of such 
large quantity that it was likely that the 
drugs were intended for further sale. Though 
Chief Adair also testified at the preliminary 
hearing regarding his participation in the 
arrest, he did not offer any testimony at the 
preliminary hearing regarding the 
significance of the quantity of 
methamphetamine found in Rothlisberger's 
pants. 
FN1. Althoff was also charged with 
various criminal counts arising out of 
this same incident. Her subsequent 
trial and convictions, however, are 
not before us as part of this appeal. 
***6 At trial, however, the prosecutor did 
not ask Officer Eberling to offer his opinion 
regarding the significance of the quantity of 
methamphetamine found in Rothlisberger's 
pants. Instead, questions regarding the 
significance of the quantity were now 
directed toward Chief Adair. The following 
colloquies occurred during Chief Adair's 
direct examination: 
Q: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion 
in your experience to look or see how 
methamphetamine is usually packaged as 
far as—when you have found 
methamphetamine in your experience, 
have you found times when people have 
had personal use amounts? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How is it usually packaged or what is 
the quantity? 
A: A quarter or half grams, right in there. 
Maybe even at the most a gram. 
Q: Do you have-through your training 
and experience, do you know commonly 
what somebody would buy if they were to 
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go out on the street buy some right now, 
what would they usually get for personal 
use? 
A: I don't understand the question. What 
do you mean what would they usually get? 
Q: Well, if I -
A: Are you talking the quantity? 
Q: Yes. 
*1196 A: In our undercover investigations 
when we buy from individuals, we usually 
buy a quarter or a half a gram. 
Q: Have you ever found in your 
experience that someone who had personal 
quantities of methamphetamine to have 
scales? 
A: It's not common, no. 
***7 Defense attorneys objected to Chief 
Adair's testimony, arguing that it should be 
deemed expert testimony under rule 702 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence and accordingly 
that admission of that expert testimony was 
improper because the State had not given the 
defense thirty-days notice of the expert 
testimony as required by Utah Code 
Annotated section 77-17-13 (2003). The 
trial court overruled this objection, ruling 
that Chief Adair's testimony was admissible 
as lay witness testimony under rule 701 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
***8 On February 11, 2003, Rothlisberger 
was found guilty on both counts. He now 
appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
**3 ***9 Rothlisberger argues that the trial 
court erred in admitting Chief Adair's 
testimony regarding the significance of the 
quantity of methamphetamine found in 
Rothlisberger's pants. We review decisions 
relating to the qualification of a witness as 
an expert or as a lay witness for an abuse of 
discretion. See Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 
917, 925 (Utah Ct.App.1989). TFN21 
FN2. Rothlisberger also argues that 
the State's pretrial failure to notify 
him of Chief Adair's potential 
testimony violated rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Because we hold that reversal is 
warranted due to the State's failure to 
comply with Utah Code Annotated 
section 77-17-13 (2003), we need not 
reach the merits of this separate 
claim. 
ANALYSIS 
£1] ***10 Under Utah Code Annotated 
section 77-17-13(l)(a) (2003), "[i]f the 
prosecution or the defense intends to call 
any expert to testify in a felony case at trial 
...the party intending to call the expert shall 
give notice to the opposing party as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before 
trial." Rothlisberger argues that Chief 
Adair's testimony regarding the significance 
of the amount of methamphetamine found 
with his pants was expert testimony, and that 
the State's failure to give him thirty-days 
notice of that testimony warrants reversal. 
We agree. 
***11 Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
lay witness testimony is defined as 
testimony that is "rationally based on the 
perception of the witness," Utah R. Evid. 
701, while expert testimony is testimony 
that is based on "scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge." Utah R. 
Evid. 702. There have been multiple Utah 
cases that have discussed the question of 
whether a witness maty be classified as an 
expert for the purposes of testifying about a 
particular subject. See, e.g., Smith v. Grand 
Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57,f 25, 
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84 P.3d 1154; Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 
UT U5.K % 52-86, 61 P.3d 1068. The 
question before us today, however, is not 
whether the State could have offered expert 
testimony regarding this subject, but rather 
whether that subject is so specialized that 
the State must first qualify its witness as an 
expert before the trial court can properly 
admit testimonial opinion regarding it. 
***12 The State contends that this subject 
was resolved by the opinion of our supreme 
court in State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 
1987). In Ellis, one of the issues before the 
court was whether a lay witness could be 
allowed to offer his opinion that two 
separate footprints that were found at the 
scene of a crime came from the same shoe. 
See id, at 190. In ruling that such testimony 
was admissible as lay witness testimony, our 
supreme court held that 
[s] imply because a question might be 
capable of scientific determination, helpful 
lay testimony touching on the issue and 
based on personal observation does not 
become expert opinion. It is true that "if 
[a question] is capable of scientific 
determination, then expert testimony is 
admissible with respect to it"; however, 
that does not mean that lay opinion 
testimony is prohibited if the provisions of 
the evidentiary rule are met. 
*1197 Id. at 191 (citation omitted) 
(alterations in original). 
***13 Contrary to the State's assertions, we 
do not think that Ellis is directly controlling 
here. In affirming the trial court's 
conclusion that the challenged testimony 
was lay testimony, the Ellis court simply 
concluded that though the subject of 
footprint comparison might be a subject 
about which experts could testify, the 
challenged testimony itself did not 
automatically meet the definitional standards 
for expert testimony. Left unresolved in 
Ellis, however, was the question of whether 
there are certain other subjects that should 
be considered so intrinsically specialized 
that a witness could not testify regarding 
them without relying on the types of 
"scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge" that are characteristic of expert 
testimony under rule 702. [FN3] 
FN3. It is worth noting that under 
Ellis's express terms the State would 
not have been prevented from calling 
an expert witness in footprint 
identification to further bolster its 
case before the jury, nor would the 
State have been prevented from 
attempting to bolster that very 
witness's own credibility by 
attempting to qualify him as an 
expert in footprint identification or 
forensic investigation. 
**4 ***i4 T 0 date, there has been no Utah 
decision that has directly addressed the 
question of whether a witness must be 
characterized as an expert in order to testify 
about a particular subject. In circumstances 
in which Utah courts have not definitively 
addressed an issue, it is appropriate for us to 
turn to decisions and commentators that 
interpret the related federal rules for 
guidance. See State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 
120.1 33 n. 5,63P.3d72. 
***15 Our review of the related federal 
cases indicates that the question of whether 
a person must be designated as an expert to 
testify regarding a particular subject is one 
that has been the subject of much 
disagreement among the federal courts. 
Some courts have taken a narrow 
interpretive approach to this question, 
holding that a witness whose testimony 
could be admitted as expert testimony under 
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rule 702 must be admitted as an expert in 
order to testify regarding that subject. In 
Randolph v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 
844 (10th Cir. 1979\ for example, the Tenth 
Circuit held that a lay witness is not 
permitted to "express an opinion as to 
matters which are beyond the realm of 
common experience and which require the 
special skill and knowledge of an expert 
witness." Id. at 846. This bright line rule 
was similarly emphasized by the Fourth 
Circuit in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 
London v. Sinkovick 232 F.3d 200 (4th 
Cir.2000), wherein the court held that rule 
701 does not permit lay witnesses to testify 
about matters that are necessarily predicated 
on "some specialized knowledge or skill or 
education that is not in the possession of the 
jurors." Id. at 203 (quotations and citation 
omitted). In this manner, courts that have 
adopted this narrow interpretive approach 
have essentially concluded that the 
definitional boundary separating rule 701 
lay testimony from rule 702 expert 
testimony should be carefully observed. In 
essence, courts following this approach hold 
that while lay witnesses are allowed to 
testify regarding their direct perceptions of 
the events in question, opinions or 
inferences that are reliant on "scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge" 
are necessarily excluded unless the witness 
is first qualified as an expert. 
***16 Other federal courts have favored a 
more liberal interpretive approach to the 
question at hand. The Fifth Circuit, for 
example, has clearly held that lay witness 
testimony may include opinions that are 
predicated on "specialized knowledge," as 
long as that testimony is rationally based on 
the "personal perception" of the witness. 
United States v. Riddle, 103 F.3d 423, 428 
(5th Cir. 1997V Thus, in Soden v. 
Freizhtliner Cory., 714 F.2d 498 (5th 
Cir. 1983), the court held that a mechanic 
was allowed to testify as a lay witness 
regarding his conclusion that a particular 
design defect was not only dangerous, but 
also the likely cause of a series of accidents. 
See id. at 510-12. In holding that the 
testimony was admissible as lay witness 
testimony, the court emphasized that the 
mechanic's testimony was based on his own 
personal observations of the involved trucks, 
see id. at 511-12, and that the opinions that 
he offered were "rationally" related *1198 to 
those personal observations. Id. at 512. The 
court thus emphasized that though the 
witness's testimony "did constitute an 
opinion which might have better been given 
by one more formally an expert," its "strong 
basis both in his observation and in his 
experience" rendered it a subject about 
which lay testimony could appropriately be 
offered. Id. 
**5 ***i7 Various other federal courts 
have followed this more liberal interpretive 
approach. For example, the Eighth Circuit 
held that "four executives of railroads" were 
allowed to testify "that, in their experience, 
trains with cabooses were no safer than 
cabooseless trains." Burlington N. R.R. Co. 
v. Nebraska, 802 F.2d 994. 1004 (8th 
Cir. 1986). According to the Burlington N. 
R.R. Co. court, this testimony was 
appropriately characterized as lay witness 
testimony because it was based on the 
executives' own "personal experiences." Id. 
Similar results were reached in such cases as 
United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 
1145 (7th Cir.l982\ and United States v. 
VonWillie. 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.1995). 
***18 The more liberal interpretive 
approach has, however, been the subject of 
some criticism. One respected commentator 
has written that "many courts expanded the 
admissibility of lay opinion and inference 
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testimony beyond Rule 70 Ts primary 
purpose, thereby permitting lay opinion 
testimony to encroach on Rule 702's 
province." 4 Joseph M. McLaughlin et al., 
Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 
701.03[4][b] (2d ed.2004). This same 
commentator further wrote that "[i]n some 
instances, it has been difficult to discern 
from the court's opinions why the admissible 
lay opinion testimony' was not, in fact, 
'expert opinion testimony.' " Id. Certain 
federal courts have been similarly critical of 
the liberal approach. The Eleventh Circuit, 
for example, has recently noted that the 
liberal approach would potentially allow 
parties to evade the strictures of the expert 
qualification process by simply 
characterizing their expert witnesses as lay 
witnesses. See Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & 
Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 
1213,1222 filth Cir.2003). 
***19 Th e s e concerns appear to have been 
shared by the drafters of the federal rules. 
Indeed, the 2000 amendment to rule 701 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence appears to 
have been expressly drafted for the purpose 
of closing this erstwhile loophole. Before 
the amendment, rules 701 and 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence were silent on the 
issue of whether lay witnesses were allowed 
to offer opinions on certain subjects that 
would normally require specialized 
knowledge. The 2000 amendment to rule 
701 changed this, however, with the rule 
now expressly declaring that lay witnesses 
are not allowed to offer testimony that is 
"based on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge within the scope of 
Rule 702." Explaining the purpose of this 
amendment, the advisory committee notes to 
rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
expressly state that "[r]ule 701 has been 
amended to eliminate the risk that the 
reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 
will be evaded through the simple expedient 
of proffering an expert in lay witness 
clothing." The advisory committee notes 
further state that 
[tjhe amendment does not distinguish 
between expert and lay witnesses, but 
rather between expert and lay testimony. 
Certainly it is possible for the same 
witness to provide both lay and expert 
testimony in a single case. The 
amendment makes clear that any part of a 
witnesses] testimony that is based upon 
scientific technical, or other specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702 is 
governed by the standards of Rule 702 and 
the corresponding disclosure requirements 
of the Civil and Criminal Rules. 
**6/d. (emphasis added). 
[21 ***20 After considering the different 
approaches to this question, we are 
persuaded that the narrow interpretive 
approach embodied by the 2000 amendment 
to rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
is the correct approach to follow in 
interpreting our own rules of evidence. 
When confronted with questions of rule-
based or statutory interpretation, we 
endeavor to interpret the rules and statutes in 
such a manner so as to give full meaning 
and effect to all of the involved provisions. 
Here, adopting the open-ended approach 
discussed above would not only blur the 
distinction between rules 701 and *1199 702 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, but would 
also create the very real danger that parties 
might impermissibly seek to avoid the 
reliability and reporting requirements 
required under our law by merely engaging 
in games of semantics. To avoid opening 
the door for such results, we think it clear 
that when a witness seeks to testify 
regarding matters that are necessarily based 
on that witness's "scientific, technical, or 
specialized knowledge," that witness must 
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be qualified as an expert under rule 702 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, and all 
reliability, reporting, or otherwise applicable 
statutory commands must then be followed 
with respect to that testimony. [FN4] 
FN4. In State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 
350 (Utah 1996), our supreme court 
noted that "when a new rule ... 
constitutes a clear break with the 
past, it is not generally applied 
retroactively." Id at 354. This is 
particularly so where a retroactive 
application would impair our efforts 
to "maintain[ ] the efficient 
administration of justice." Id. 
We recognize here that our 
interpretation of rules 701 and 702 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence settles a 
question for which there had been 
little prior guidance from Utah 
appellate courts. We further 
recognize that this issue is likely the 
subject of some dispute in many 
cases that are currently before our 
various courts. In order to maintain 
the efficient administration of 
justice, we accordingly hold that 
today's opinion should only be 
applied prospectively, and that any 
decisions relating to this question 
that were entered prior to today's 
holding should not be reversed 
thereby. 
***21 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in 
United States v. Fizueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 
1241 (9th Cir.l997\ is instructive. In 
Figueroa-Lopez, the defendant was charged 
with various counts relating to an illegal 
drug transaction. See id. at 1242. At trial, 
various federal agents who were involved in 
the surveillance of the defendant testified 
regarding the events leading up to the arrest. 
See id. One agent, testifying as a lay 
witness, asserted that the defendant had 
engaged in "countersurveillance" activities 
that were "common practice for narcotics 
dealers" and that the defendant's use of a 
rental car was also "a common practice for 
narcotics dealers." Id. at 1243. On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit overruled the trial court's 
conclusions that the testimony was properly 
admissible as lay witness testimony. See id. 
at 1246. In so ruling, the appellate court 
found that the testimony was necessarily 
predicated on "demonstrable expertise" in 
the area of law enforcement, id, and that the 
subjects about which the agent testified were 
therefore not "common enough" to be the 
subject of lay witness testimony. Id. at 1245. 
Responding to the government's argument 
that the testimony was admissible as lay 
witness testimony due to its reliance on the 
agent's own personal observations, the court 
noted that the government's argument would 
"simply blur[ ] the distinction between 
Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702.... A 
holding to the contrary would simply 
encourage the Government to offer all kinds 
of specialized opinions without pausing first 
properly to establish the required 
qualifications of their witnesses." Id. at 
1246. 
**7 ***22 Importantly, the Figueroa-
Lopez court then identified portions of 
another agent's testimony that were properly 
admissible as lay witness testimony. Noting 
that one of the agents had testified regarding 
the "suspicious" nature of the defendant's 
conduct, the court expressly held that 
opinions regarding whether a person is 
acting suspiciously are "common enough" to 
be admissible as lay witness testimony. Id. 
at 1246. The decision in Figueroa-Lopez 
therefore provides an example of how the 
rules do "not distinguish between expert and 
lay witnesses, but rather between expert and 
lay testimony." Fed R. Evid. 701 advisory 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
95P.3d 1193 Page 9 
95 P.3d 1193, 2004 WL 1469314 (Utah App.), 503 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 2004 UT App 226 
(Cite as: 95 P.3d 1193, 2004 WL 1469314 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 226) 
committee notes. Thus, it is "[c]ertainly ... 
possible for the same witness to provide 
both lay and expert testimony in a single 
case." Id 
***23 The question before us in the 
present case, then, is whether Chief Adair's 
testimony regarding the significance of the 
quantity of methamphetamine found in 
Rothlisberger's pants was the type of 
testimony that was necessarily based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge. We hold that it was. 
[31 ***24 It is well settled that witnesses 
can be qualified as experts not only on the 
basis of formal educational training, but also 
on the basis of their own personal or 
vocational experiences. See, e.g., State v. 
Kellev. 2000 UT 4 1 ^ 15, 1 P.3d 546; 
niOORandle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 
(Utah 1993). In State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 
420 (Utah 1986\ for example, our supreme 
court held that a witness's prior experience 
as a "user and seller" of drugs qualified him 
to testify as an expert on "the current drug 
culture." Id at 420. Similarly, in Randle, 
our supreme court held that a witness could 
be qualified as an expert in accident 
reconstruction by virtue of his practical 
experience dealing with such matters. See 
Randle, 862 P.2dat 1337. 
***25 There have been no Utah cases that 
have specifically addressed the question of 
whether knowledge of the significance of a 
particular quantity of an illegal drug should 
be regarded as specialized knowledge about 
which a witness must be qualified as an 
expert in order to testify. The Tenth Circuit, 
however, has specifically addressed this 
question and has definitively concluded that 
such knowledge should be regarded as 
specialized knowledge. In United States v. 
McDonald 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.l99R 
the court noted that the "[defendant 
possessed 6.7 grams of rock cocaine." Id at 
1522. The court then concluded that "[a] 
person possessing no knowledge of the drug 
world would find the importance of this fact 
impossible to understand. The average juror 
would not know whether this quantity is a 
mere trace, or sufficient to pollute 1000 
people." Id. In United States v. Muldrow, 19 
F.3d 1332 (10th Cir.l994\ the court 
similarly held that "a veteran police officer" 
testified from "specialized knowledge" when 
he testified that a particular amount of 
cocaine would likely be "for distribution and 
not for personal use." Id at 1338. 
**8 141 ***26 We agree with the Tenth 
Circuit's assessment of this question. In our 
view, knowledge regarding the significance 
of a particular quantity of drug is "beyond 
the realm of common experience" for the 
common juror, Randolph 590 F.2d at 846, 
and is accordingly the type of testimony that 
a witness could offer only if first qualified as 
an expert. [FN5] Applied to the present case, 
Chief Adair was clearly permitted to offer 
lay witness testimony regarding the events 
leading up to Rothlisberger's arrest. Chief 
Adair was further permitted to offer 
testimony that was rationally derived from 
his perceptions of the events on that day. 
Such testimony could also have included 
any opinions relating to any matters arising 
therefrom that would have been within the 
common experience of a common citizen. 
The State was not permitted, however, to 
elicit any opinions or conclusions from 
Chief Adair that were necessarily based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge, without first seeking to qualify 
him as an expert witness under *1201 rule 
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
testimony from Chief Adair based on his 
specialized knowledge was therefore 
permissible only upon compliance with all 
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applicable laws and rules relating to expert 
testimony. Because the trial court allowed 
Chief Adair to testify as a lay witness 
regarding these matters, we thus necessarily 
conclude that the court abused its discretion. 
1TN61 
FN5. The State argues that, under 
the terms of our decision in Provo 
City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 
(Utah Ct.App.1993), we should 
reach a different result on this 
question. In Spotts, we held that a 
lay witness was permitted to testify 
regarding the identity of a particular 
drug. See id at 442-43. In reaching 
that conclusion, we ,femphasize[d] 
that [the] case involved not only the 
substance's smell, but also 
simultaneous observation of the 
smoke exiting defendant's mouth and 
prior observation of the act of taking 
'hits' from a 'joint' " Id at 443. In 
our view, the result in Spotts was 
necessarily predicated on our 
recognition of the degree to which 
certain drugs have permeated our 
society. Because of this 
proliferation, knowledge of the 
appearance, smell, and resultant 
physical effects of certain substances 
can unfortunately be considered 
common knowledge in our society. 
Our decision in Spotts implicitly 
acknowledged this sad state of 
affairs, and thus appropriately held 
that opinions regarding the identity 
of particular substances can be the 
subject of lay testimony. The 
question before us here, however, 
does not deal with the common 
juror's ability to merely identify a 
particular substance, but instead 
deals with the common juror's ability 
to identify whether a particular 
quantity of an illegal substance is so 
large that it would likely be used for 
future sale. By definition, the only 
persons having such knowledge 
would be those who are either 
actually involved in the sale of 
illegal substances, or those who are 
involved in lav/ enforcement's efforts 
to curb such sales. Either way, this 
knowledge must be regarded as 
specialized, and testimony that is 
based on that knowledge would 
therefore appropriately be 
characterized as expert testimony. 
Notably, a similar result was 
emphasized by the federal rules 
advisory committee. As noted in the 
advisory committee notes to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 701, testimony 
that a substance appeared to be a 
narcotic .... is not based on 
specialized knowledge within the 
scope of Rule 702, but rather is 
based upon a layperson's personal 
knowledge. If, however, that witness 
were to describe how a narcotic was 
manufactured, or to describe the 
intricate workings of a narcotic 
distribution network, then the 
witness would have to qualify as an 
expert under Rule 702. Fed.R.Evid. 
701 advisory committee's note. 
FN6. After the conclusion of the 
trial, the trial court was asked to 
reconsider its prior ruling regarding 
the nature of Chief Adair's 
testimony. In this post-trial ruling, 
the court held that Chief Adair's 
testimony "actually turned out to be 
neither expert testimony or lay 
opinion testimony, but merely 
testimony about Adair's actual 
experiences." In support of that 
conclusion, the court noted that 
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Chief Adair had not actually offered 
a direct opinion as to whether the 
quantity of methamphetamine that 
was found in Rothlisberger's pants 
was a saleable quantity, but that 
Chief Adair had instead simply 
testified in general terms regarding 
the significance of such quantities in 
his past experiences. The State thus 
argues that we should alternatively 
affirm the rulings below on the basis 
of this post-trial ruling. We disagree. 
The trial court may have been 
technically correct in noting that 
Chief Adair did not offer a direct 
opinion as to whether Rothlisberger 
had the intent to distribute illegal 
drugs. As noted by the trial court, it 
does appear that the questions 
relating to the significance of various 
quantities of illegal drugs were 
framed with reference to Chief 
Adair's past experiences, and that 
Chief Adair was never directly asked 
how the quantity of 
methamphetamine that was found in 
Rothlisberger's possession 
comported with those prior 
experiences. The State's failure to 
elicit such direct, case-specific 
opinion testimony does not mean, 
however, that Chief Adair's 
testimony should not still be 
regarded as expert testimony. Rule 
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
specifically states that an expert who 
testified "by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education 
may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise" (Emphasis 
added.) Under its express terms, the 
rule therefore contemplates that non-
opinion testimony can still be 
qualified as expert testimony if it is 
based on specialized knowledge or 
experience. One example of non-
opinion expert testimony is then 
specifically referred to in rule 703 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, which 
states that expert testimony may be 
admitted in the form of "an opinion 
or inference." We think it plain that, 
in the present circumstances, Chief 
Adair's testimony was certainly 
intended to create the inference that 
the thirty-two grams of 
methamphetamine found in 
Rothlisberger's pants were of such a 
large quantity that an intent to 
distribute could be inferred. Cf. 
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 320 
(Utah 1985) (noting that the quantity 
of an illegal substance can be used as 
evidence of an intent to distribute); 
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 
1262 (Utah 1983) (same). As such, 
the trial court erred in its conclusion 
that Chief Adair's failure to offer a 
direct opinion as to the meaning of 
this particular evidence rendered his 
testimony admissible as non-expert 
testimony. 
***27 Having concluded that the trial 
court abused its discretion in characterizing 
Chief Adair's testimony as lay witness 
testimony, we can readily conclude that the 
State was required to comply with the notice 
requirements for expert witnesses contained 
in Utah Code Annotated section 77-17-13 
(2003V Under section 77-17-13(l¥a), the 
State was required to provide Rothlisberger 
with thirty-days notice that it intended to 
offer Chief Adair as an expert witness; 
section 77-17-13(lYb) specifically requires 
that notice to include 
the name and address of [Chief Adair], 
[Chief Adair]'s curriculum vitae, and one 
of the following: 
(i) a copy of [Chief Adairj's report, if one 
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exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of [Chief Adair]'s 
proposed testimony sufficient to give the 
opposing party adequate notice to prepare 
to meet the testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to 
cooperatively consult with the opposing 
party on reasonable notice. 
***28 The State argues that, even if we 
conclude that Chief Adair's testimony 
constituted expert testimony, compliance 
with section 77-17-13 was still not required 
for two reasons. First, the State argues that 
Rothlisberger's failure to request a 
continuance acted as a waiver of his right to 
notice. Second, the State argues that 
Rothlisberger was given notice of the 
proposed testimony by virtue of the similar 
testimony that was offered by Officer 
Eberling at the preliminary hearing. We 
disagree. 
[51 [61 ***29 It is generally true that, when 
a party is confronted with surprise expert 
testimony at trial, a failure to request a 
continuance acts as a waiver of the right to 
challenge the admission of that testimony. 
See State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211,f 37, 
52 P.3d 451 ("When the prosecution 
introduces unexpected testimony, a 
defendant 'essentially *1202 waives his right 
to later claim error' if the defendant fails to 
request a continuance or seek other 
appropriate relief under Rule 16(g) [of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure]." 
(Quoting State v. Rugebrezt. 965 P.2d 518, 
522 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (quoting State v. 
Larson 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989)).)). 
In contrast to the waiver cases cited by the 
State, however, the situation before us is not 
one in which the defendant failed to request 
a continuance upon being presented with 
surprise expert testimony. Rather, this is a 
situation in which, after receiving the 
appropriate objection from the defendant, 
the trial court expressly determined that the 
challenged testimony was not expert 
testimony, but that it was instead admissible 
as lay witness testimony. As discussed 
above, we have determined that that ruling 
was in error. As a result of the trial court's 
ruling, however, the mandatory continuance 
provisions of section 77-17-13f4)fa) would 
have necessarily been deemed inapplicable, 
insofar as there was no court-recognized 
expert testimony being offered. In essence, 
the trial court's ruling that the testimony was 
lay witness testimony rendered any 
objection that was predicated on expert-
testimony rules futile. Under our law, 
parties are not required to make futile 
objections in order to preserve a future 
claim. See Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT 
ADD 286,111 13, 16, 76 P.3d 1170. Thus, 
because the trial court first erred by 
concluding that the challenged testimony 
was admissible as lay witness testimony, we 
cannot say that Rothlisberger waived his 
right to challenge the admission of that 
testimony by then failing to request a 
continuance under section 77-17-13(4)fa). 
**9 jTj ***30 N e x t j section 77-17-13(5)(a) 
provides that "testimony of an expert at a 
preliminary hearing .... constitutes notice of 
the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a 
report of the expert's proposed trial 
testimony as to the subject matter testified to 
by the expert at the preliminary hearing." 
We disagree with the State's suggestion, 
however, that the testimony of Officer 
Eberling at the preliminary hearing provided 
Rothlisberger with notice of the similar 
testimony that was ultimately offered by 
Chief Adair at trial. Under the terms of 
section 77-17-13(1)0:)), a party who is 
seeking to offer expert testimony must first 
provide the other party with a copy of the 
expert's name, address, and curriculum 
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vitae. This clearly contemplates that the 
opposing party will have the opportunity to 
prepare for that expert's testimony in a 
witness-specific fashion. See Turner v. 
Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021. 1023 (Utah 1994) 
(holding that one of the "significant 
purposes" of pretrial witness disclosure rules 
is to provide the opposing party with the 
opportunity to "investigat[e] the witnesses] 
testimony" and "prepar[e] an effective cross-
examination"). In State v. Tolano, 2001 UT 
App 37,19P.3d400, we held that the notice 
provision of section 77-17-13(5)(a) is only 
satisfied where a witness personally testifies 
at the preliminary hearing; otherwise, the 
opposing party would not have the time to 
"prepare to meet [the] adverse expert 
testimony." Id. at f^ 18 (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
£81 ***31 Here, Officer Eberlingfs 
testimony at the preliminary hearing did not 
provide Rothlisberger with the proper 
opportunity to prepare for Chief Adair's 
expert testimony. Though the testimonies of 
the two officers might ultimately have been 
similar in content, it is nevertheless clear 
that the State's failure to provide notice of 
Chief Adair's potential expert testimony at 
trial deprived Rothlisberger of the notice 
that he would need to prepare a witness-
specific response to that testimony. Thus, 
because Chief Adair failed to testify as an 
expert at the preliminary hearing, the State's 
failure to provide Rothlisberger with notice 
of his testimony constituted a violation of 
section 77-17-13(5)(a). Inasmuch as that 
testimony was central to the Possession with 
Intent to Distribute charge, we accordingly 
reverse Rothlisberger's conviction. [FN7] 
FN7. Rothlisberger also argues (i) 
that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion for a directed verdict; (ii) 
that the trial court erred in overruling 
his objection to various statements 
made by the prosecutor in his closing 
statement; and (iii) that the trial 
court erred by failing to instruct the 
jury on the alternate reasonable 
hypotheses of innocence. Because 
we have already determined that a 
new trial is warranted with respect to 
Rothlisberger's conviction for 
Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with Intent to Distribute, we need not 
address these arguments with respect 
to that charge. 
With respect to Rothlisberger's 
arguments relating to his conviction 
for Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, we conclude that 
reversal is not warranted. As noted 
above, Rothlisberger admitted to the 
officers that the snort tube that was 
found in the car was his. 
Rothlisberger has not contested the 
admissibility of that admission 
before this court, nor has he argued 
that the snort tube does not constitute 
drug paraphernalia under Utah Code 
Annotated section 58-37a-3 (2002). 
As such, we can readily conclude 
that the court did not err in denying 
his motion for a directed verdict on 
that charge. We can further 
conclude that any error that the court 
might have made with respect to the 
rulings regarding either the 
prosecutor's closing statements or the 
alternate reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence doctrine was harmless. 
Accordingly, Rothlisberger's 
conviction for Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia is affirmed. 
*1203 CONCLUSION 
***32 We conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion when it allowed Chief 
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Adair to testify as a lay witness about the 
significance of various quantities of 
methamphetamine. Because the State failed 
to give Rothlisberger thirty-days notice of 
that testimony as required by Utah Code 
Annotated section 77-17-13 (2003\ we 
reverse Rothlisberger's conviction for 
Possession with Intent to Distribute and 
remand for a new trial on that charge. 
***33 I CONCUR: GREGORY K. 
ORME, Judge. 
***34 I DISSENT: RUSSELL W. 
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge. 
95 P.3d 1193, 2004 WL 1469314 (Utah 
App.), 503 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 2004 UT 
App 226 
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Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and 
THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
THORNE, Judge: 
*1 Toyna Althoff appeals her conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance with the 
intent to distribute, as well as her associated 
convictions for possession of drug 
paraphernalia and various traffic related 
crimes. We reverse. 
Althoffs arrest, conviction, and appeal 
mirror those of her companion at the time of 
her arrest, Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger. See 
State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, 95 
P.3d 1193, cert granted, 2004 Utah LEXIS 
248 (Utah Nov. 24, 2004). Moreover, she 
presents an issue that is identical to the issue 
central to our decision in Rothlisberger, 
namely, whether the trial court erred in 
refusing to recognize that a portion of Chief 
Adair's testimony was expert testimony and, 
if so, whether Althoffs right to notice of the 
nature of Adair's testimony and his 
background was violated. See id. at \ \ 10-
27. Having decided in Rothlisberger, under 
identical circumstances, that the trial court's 
decision was improper, and that the State 
failed to comply with the requirements of 
Utah Code section 77-17-13 (2003), we are 
compelled to follow that decision here. See 
State v. Simms, 881 P.2d 840, 843 n.7 (Utah 
1994) ("Stare decisis requires that a decision 
rendered by a court in a particular factual 
context govern later decisions by that court 
arising under the same or similar facts."). 
Accordingly, we . reverse Althoffs 
convictions and remand this case for a new 
trial. [FN1] 
FN1. The Utah Supreme Court has 
granted the State's petition for 
certiorari in State v. Rothlisberger. 
See 2004 UT App 226, 95 P.3d 1193, 
cert, granted, 2004 Utah LEXIS 248 
(Utah Nov. 24, 2004). Assuming that 
the State's dissatisfaction with the 
outcome of the instant case mirrors 
its position in Rothlisberer, we 
encourage it to move for 
consolidation of the two cases. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge, 
and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge. 
2005 WL 375089 (Utah App.), 2005 UT 
App 69 
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